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Property was insured for the benefit of the mortgagee, as its interest
may appear. Previous to such insurance the mortgage was duly fore-
closed, the premium was paid by the mortgagee, but the time for
redemption did not arrive until after the insurance.
It was held by the court that "the non-redemption from the mortgage
sale by the owner of the premises did not work an alienation of the-
property, so as to defeat the policy, but that an action might be main-
tained in case of loss without notice to the insurance company of such-
non-redemption, and a notation thereof made on the policy, notwith-
standing the policy provided that the mortgagee should notify the
company of any change of ownership in the property insured, and that it
be so noted on the policy."
EFFECT OF A MORTGAGE CLAUSE IN CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE.
From an early period in the business of insurance, resort
has been had in various forms to these contracts as security
for all kinds of indebtedness. To effect this class of security
it has long been a custom with insurance companies arid those
dealing with them for the purpose of making their destructible
property more valuable and desirable as security, to have a
proviso embodied in the policy to this or like effect: " Loss,
if any, payable to Richard Roe as his interest-or mortgage
interest, as it is sometimes expressed-may appear." This
seems to have been the earliest and is yet, perhaps, the most
general mode of making a policy payable to one other than the
assured for the purpose of security. Sometimes, too, the
policy is assigned as collateral security for the same purpose.
I Reported in 61 Northwestern, 828.
IN CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE.
There are some authorities which hold that where the assured
obtains a policy ahd assigns it absolutely to another, the coffi-
pany. consentirig, this will operate as a new contract between
the company and the assignee; that the assignor thereby
becomes a stranger to the contract and could neither receipt
for the policy, prevent a recovery by the assignee, not do any
act which would invalidate the policy as to the assignee:
Pollard v. Insurance CO., 42 Me. 226. And in such casesi the
action cahnot be maintained, as eL general rule; in the name of
the assignee, but must be brought in the name of the assignor
for th use of the assignee: FAainagiii v. Ins. Co., i Dutch.
(N. J.) 5o6 Folsomu v. Ins. Co., 10 Foster, (N. R.) 231;
Pollard v. Ins. Co., supra ; Connover v. Ins Co., 3 Den. 254 ;
Coates v. Is. Co., 58 Md. 172. And some of the authorities
hold whete the owner of the property insured has ceased to
have any vested or contingent interest in the insurance, and
the policy, by its terms, is made payable to the bearer or to a
third person, or is so made payable after its execution by
proper indorsement, such third party, bearer or indorsee may
bring aft action on the contract in his own name, as effectively
as though the policy had been originally executed to such
third party : Barrett et al. v. Ins. Co., 7 Cuch. (Mass.) 175 ;
Hand v. Ins. Co., 57 N. Y. 41 ; Motley v. Ins. Co., 29 Me.
337; Cone v. Ins. Co. 6o N. Y. 619.
In an early case in New York it was held that where insur-
ance is granted to the owner of the property and payable in
whole or in part to a third person, the action must be brought
in the name of the originally insured unless he had transferred
and conveyed the whole property to such third person, and
that such party dould not otherwise sue. This ruling was
under a statute of New York, however, which provided "That,
in case any one insured should sell and assigh the subject of
insurance, with the consent of the company before the loss,
such vendee or assignee might bring an action on the policy
in his own name. And when bringing the suit such assignee
must not only show that he has an interest in the subject
matter but that he has the whole interest." Otherwise he
cannot sue-at least, alone : Conover v. -ns. Co., 3 Den. 254.
EFFECT OF A MORTGAGE CLAUSE
In another case, in the same State, it was held in an action on
a policy payable to a third person, as his interest might appear,
that such language imports ownership in such person in the
property insured, and that he or his assignee might maintain
an action in his own name without joining the assured: Pitney
v. Glenns Falls Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 6. But such words certainly
do not import ownership. The interest may be partial and still
be an interest. In another case it was held, that though the
incumbrancer, to whom the insurance is made payable, may
have realized from other securities the whole or a part of his
mortgage debt, this will not prevent the incumbrancer from
suing on a policy in his own name, nor will the company in
such case succeed or be subrogated to the rights of the third
party to whom the insurance is made payable. And the com-
pany cannot demand or make any inquiry as to the status of
the accounts as between the third party and the owner of the
property: Cone v. Ins. -Co., 6o N. Y. 619.
In an Iowa case where a policy was indorsed, payable to
mortgagees as their interest may appear, it was held that
the mortgagees could maintain an action on the policy, there
being no other mortgagees, and this though the mortgage debt
was satisfied before the action was brought, the consideration
for the satisfaction of the mortgage, however, being a transfer
of the property remaining after the fire, and the assignment of
the policy: Bartlett v. Iowa State Ins. Co., 77 Iowa, 86; 41
N. W. 579. But where the property thus undestroyed is
transferred for a valuable consideration, with the policy of
insurance, the assignee succeeds to all the rights of the assured
and a settlement with the assignee for the liability incurred
by issuing the policy would be wholly extinguished by making
payment or satisfaction to the assignee. There is then no
contingency whereby the assured could claim any right of
action against the company. His assignment of the policy
and transfer of the property covered thereby in payment of the
mortgage debt completely extinguishes all his right and inter-
est in the policy. It is held with very good reason in New
Hampshire that where the mortgagee, for his protection, takes
,out a policy payable to himself as his mortgage interest may
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appears and his mortgage debt at the time of the loss is greater
than t e face of the policy, it is not necessary to make the
roiminally assp.re a party: Vadley v. -his. Co., 55 N. H. i
C11mnber/qi, Y. Ins. Co., 55 N H. 249. This is reasonable. The
interest insured here is not that of the mortgagor, It is ta en
out and paid for by the mortgagee for his own use and benefit
and on property in which, by reason of his mortgage, he has
an insurable interest. The mortgagor has no interest, what-
ever in a policy so issued, and the mortgagee having the
sole and exclusive owynership and interest therein, it could
serve no purpose to join the mortgagor as a party to an
action pn the policy. It seems to have been the rule in
this State, in comparatiirely early times, when most of
the insurance business was transacted through mutual com-
panies, that the assured, by becoming a member of such com-
pany for the purpose of obtaining his insurance (his loss being
directed by the terms of the policy to be paid to a designated
person), the action must be brought by the assured, and cannot
be maintained by such third party alone: Nez4ns v. ZIs. Co.,
25 N. H. 22; Rollins v. Ins. Co., 25 N. H. 200; Fplsom v.
Ins. Co., 30 N. H. 231; Blanchardv. Ins. Co., 33 N. H. 9;
P4'erce v. I11s. C., 5o N. H. 297. And in Illinois a compara-
tively early case announces the doctrine that where a policy is
assigned by the insured, with the consent of the company, the
assignee may sue on the policy for his own use in the name of
the assured, but he cannot alone maintain the action. In this
case, too, the policy was issued directly to the mortgagee, was
for his exclusive benefit, and it was his interest only that was
protected. A similar doctrine was laid down in Maryland
where a policy was taken out on property which, at the time,
was expressly made payable to the mortgagee by its terms,
and which insured only the interest of such mortgagee. It
was held that the policy, which by its terms insured one party
but made the loss payable to another, would be construed in
law as having been at its inception assigned to such third party
with the consent of the company, and he is entitled to its
benefits without procuring a transfer from the assured to the
mortgagee with the consent of the company. Nor will the
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fact that the mortgagor disposes of all his interest in the
insured property prior to the bringing of the action by the
mortgagee prevent the mortgagee from maintaining the action:
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Crane, 16 Md. 260. In Hammd v.
The Queens Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240; 6 N. W. 8o5, it is held
that where a policy is made payable to the mortgagee as his
interest shall appear, and if the debt due from the mortgagor
exceed the face of the policy the legal title to the policy is in
the mortgagee, and he can maintain an action thereon alone.
This ruling was made by a divided court, ORTON, J., in a
vigorous dissenting opinion stoutly maintaining that the mort-
gagor was a necessary party. The doctrine of this case finds
support in Travellers Ins. Co. v. California Ins. Co., i N. D.
S51; 45 N. W. 703; West Coast Lumber Co. v. Ins. Co., 98
Cal. 502; 33 Pac. 258. Ordinarily, however, where the insur-
ance is issued on the application of the insured, and made
payable to a third person by indorsement for the purpose of
securing a debt, it is absolutely necessary that all who have an
interest in the policy, vested or contingent, be made parties,
either plaintiff or defendant, to the end that all rights there-
under may be adjudicated in one action, and that the company
may not be unnecessarily harassed by two suits on a single
contract. Let us suppose that A owes B $5oo. A takes
out a policy of insurance on his property for $iooo. For
the better protection of his creditor, he has an indorsement
placed on it making the loss, if any, payable to B as his mort-
gage interest may appear. The interest of B is clearly only
five hundred dollars. A, too, has an actual interest in the same
policy. A loss occurs, however, and B brings the action
alone and in his own name. We will suppose that the whole
of his debt is unpaid. Now, what is the effect of a recovery
by B alone on this policy to the extent of his $5oo? What
is the effect if the insurance company is compelled to pay
such a judgment? What would be the further effect if A
should, after the recovery of the judgment and money by B,
pay B off, which in duty he is bound to do. B then has no
interest in the policy, though he has recovered his $500.
He may be held a trustee, for A, perhaps, but what if he
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squanders the money? A is not responsible to the company
for B's conduct. He has the right to pay B at any time,
and the very instant he does so, his right of action
becoies entire and indivisible, and he has a just right to
proceed against the company for the full face of his policy if
he has complied with all its terms which he may, and is pre-
sumed, to have done. Of course the result might be the same if
A owed B $1500 instead of only $500, according to some of
the cases-only a very few, however,-if the face of the policy
does not exceed the amount of the debt, the mortgagee may
sue alone. Of course he can recover the whole amount of
his debt when the amount of the policy is less than his debt,
just as well as he could recover half of it if the face of the
policy were double the debt. When the mortgage debt
is paid, that, ipso facto, extinguishes every right of the mort-
gagee in the policy, he can thereafter bring no action on it,
but the assured can bring it alone just as thougl there had
never been any mortgage indorsement contained in the policy.
Again, let us suppose that A takes out a policy on his house
for $iooo. He also borrows $iooo from B, and in order to
secure B, he has the policy made payable to B as his mort-
gage interest may appear. A now really has his insurance
money to start with. He may be little concerned in keep-
ing the terms of the policy. If his house burns, he is not
at any loss, for he knows B can sue on the policy and
recover the full $iooo. Suppose A then destroys his own
house? If B can maintain the action, as some of the cases
hold, the law will have permitted A to profit by his own
infamy, and will allow B to recover on a policy issued to A,
-and insuring his property after A, according to the very
terms of the contract under which B claims, and through
whom he must receive any right to recover at all, has for-
feited all right of recovery whatever. These illustrations have
been resorted to show the dangers to which the rulings of
some of the courts might lead, and the manifest injustice that
might follow. And they further demonstrate the importance
of the rule which permits the assignee or mortgagee to recover
only when the assured or mortgagor himself could do so; and
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that all who have an interest in the subject matter of the action-
should be made parties, to the end that all rights, arising under
a single contract, might be adjudicated in a single action.
That an action on a policy where it is payable to a third
person as mortgagee cannot be split up into two actions, and
the company thereby subjected to two suits on one policy, is
fortified not only by thebetter reasoning, but by most respectable
authority as well: Carberry v. Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 323, 56 N.
W. 920; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 37 Mich. 613;
Shove v. Shove, 69 Wis. 425 ; 34 N, W. 392; Thatch v. Ins.
Co., i i Fed. 29. See, also, Norwich Union Ins. Soc. v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 59 Fed. 984.
It is held in Illinois that when the insurance is effected by
the mortgagor he holds the legal title, and may maintain
an action on the policy for the use of the mortgagee: Ill. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Stanton, 57 Ill. 354. This is especially true at
common law under which the assignee of any chose in action
cannot sue to enforce the rights assigned, in his own name,
but must bring the action in the name of his assignor. This
rule applies to that class of cases in which the policies are
made payable in whole or in part to third persons, either by
the terms of the policy itself, or by the assignment of the
interest of the originally insured to another: New England
Fire & J farine Ins. Co. v. Wetmore, 32 Ill. 221 ; Flannigan v.
Ins. Co., i Dutch. (N. J.) 5o6; Folsom v. Ins. Co., IO Foster,
(N. H.), 251 ; Pollard v. Ins. Co., 42 Me. 221 ; Conover v.
In's. Co., 3 Den. 254; Jessel v. Ins. Co., 3 Hill, 88 ; Bo-wditch
v. Ins. Co., 3 Gray (Mass.) 415 ; Coates v. Ins. Co., 58 Md. 172.
It was held in Wynne v. AWiagra Fire Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. I85,
that where a policy is payable to a third person as interest may
appear, the owner of the property and mortgagee may well be
joined as parties plaintiff in an action under the policy; that
such mortgagee and insured have no adverse interest in the sub-
ject matter of an action, but, on the contrary, have a common
interest in enforcing the contract; that the fund realized is
applicable first, to the payment of the mortgage debt, and, if
any remain, to the assured. To the same effect is the case of
Baynton v. Ins. Co., 16 Barb. 224, where it is further held that
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where the assured, after assigning his policy as collateral,
violates some of the provisions of the policy, there can be no
recovery beyond the debt so secured, through both motgagee
and assured are proper parties plaintiff.
Upon the issuance of a policy of insurance, loss, if any, pay-
able to the mortgagee, as his interest may appear, some of the
courts hold that the legal title is vested in the mortgagee by
the terms of the mortgage itself: Hammell v. Queens Ins. Co.,
5o Wis. 240; 6 N. W. 805 ; Travellers Ins. Co. v. California
hns. Co., i N. D. I51; 45 N. W. 703; The Appleton Iron Co.
v. Assur. Co., 46 Wis. 23; I N. W. 9. This being the case,
the mortgagee could at least sue in his own name for the
amount due him from the mortgagor, and could control any
judgment that might be recovered to the extent of his interest.
But while it may be conceded, for the sake of argument, that
such a stipulation in a policy has this effect, yet the fact
remains that this is only a contingent assignment of such legal
title, and, upon the payment by the mortgagor to the mort-
gagee of the full debt thus secured, the title of the former in
the policy revives and becomes paramount and exclusive. The
clause does not effect an 'assignment of the policy either in
whole or in part: Martin v. Ins. Co., 9 Vr. 140; Loring v.
Ins. Co., 8 Gray (Mass.), 28. The contract of insurance is
with the owner; it is to protect his property and not that of
his mortgagee, and a loss under such policy is a loss to the
assured, notwithstanding the mortgage clause, though the
mortgagee has certain rights which the courts will protect:
Franklin Savings Institution v. Ins. Co., I 19 Mass. 240 ; Fogg
v. Ins. Co., io Cush. (Mass.), 337; Hale v. Ins. Co., 6 Gray
(Mass.), 169. And the mortgagor will not be permitted to
settle with the company and thereby exclude the rights of the
mortgagee. His interest in the policy can still be enforced,
though the assured may execute for a full consideration, a
complete acquittance to the company: Hathaw'ay v. Ins. Co.,
13 4 N. Y. 43 9 ; 3 2 N. E. 40.
In a case where the owner of property, upon which he had
obtained a policy of insurance, subsequently mortgaged the
same to secure a debt, and assigned the policy as collateral to
EFFECT OF A MORTGAGE CLAUSE
further secure the same, and upon the property being destroyed,
the mortgagor instituted an action on the policy for the use of
the assignee of the policy, the question arose in the case as to
what effect a violation of any of the terms of the policy by the
assured would have on the right of the mortgagee and assignee
to recover. The opinion in the case shows great research and
learning and is supported by the most unanswerable reasoning.
The court reviews a number of cases on the subject and pays
especial attention to that of Traders' Ins. Co. v. Robert, 17
Wend. 63 1, as well as other cases of the same tenor. The ruling
of the lower court presented this question: "whether, where a
policy of insurance has been assigned by the insured to one
holding a mortgage on the premises, with the consent of the
company indorsed upon the policy, its validity can be destroyed
by acts done by the assignor in violation of its conditions."
The court further says: "This question has received much
discussion in the courts of New York and the decisions first
made have been deliberately overruled. It was first held in
Traders' Ins. Co. v. Robert, 9 Wend. 404, that no act of the
assured, after the assignment of the policy, with the consent of
the company, can impair the rights of the assignee. This
case was approved and followed in Tillou v. Ins. Co., i Seld.
406, the court holding that the assignment of the policy, with
the assent of the insurer, creates new and mutual relations and
rights between the assignee and the insurer, which cannot be
impaired by a third person over whom the assignee had no
control. The question again came up in Grosvenor v. Ins.
Co., 17 N. Y. 392, and in Buffalo Steam Engine Works v. Ins.
Co., Id. 401. In the first case the policy was not assigned by
the mortgagor to the mortgagee, but by its original terms the
loss, in case of fire was made payable to the mortgagee. The
majority of the court held the cause was not distinguished from
an assignment of the policy, and, overruling the cases already
cited, held the policy was avoided by certain acts done by the
mortgagor in violation of the terms of the policy. . . . In
these two cases the question involved received a much fuller
discussion than was given to it when the former decisions were
rendered. In reply to the argument of the court in 9 Wend.
IN CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE.
that the assignor could not be permitted to execute a release
to the insurance company which would impair the rights of the
assignee, and that he should not be permitted to do indirectly
what he could not do directly, the court very justly says:
'This argument fails to distinguish between acts done for the
purpose of discharging a liability and acts which, by the terms
of the contract were necessary to be done or omitted in order
to continue the liability of the company in force.'"
The Robert case also received a stunning blow at the hands
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in State .Hutual Fire
Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 31 Pa. 438, wherein STRONG, J., delivering
the opinion of the court, among other things, said: "I am
aN% are that there are to be found in the decisions of two courts
of our sister States, adjudications that such assignments-
assignments of the policy with the consent of the company-
are equivalent to new policies issued to the assignees. Of
course it is meant to refer to those cases where the assignee
has an insurable interest, for, as the contract is one of indem-
nity, where there is no interest there can be no loss. The
cases are. Traders Ins. Co. v. Robert, 9 Wend. 404; Tilou v.
Ins. Co., I Seld. 405, and Charleston Ins. Co. v. Neve, 2 McMul.
(S. C.) 237. Both the latter were decided on the authority of
:he former. That was an action in the Supreme Court of New
York, and so far as it relates to the doctrine now under discus-
sion, has never been reviewed in the Court of Appeals. There
a mortgagor, having effected an insurance on the mortgaged
property, assigned his policy to the mortgagee with the assent
of the insurers. It contained a condition against other insur-
ance similar to that. After the assignment he effected other
insurance upon the same property. It was held that though
the assignee was compelled to sue in the name of the origi-
nally insured, yet the subsequent insurance did not affect his
right to recover. He was treated as if the policy had been
issued to protect his interest as mortgagee. It must be
admitted that this case is in entire accordance with the ruling
of the lower court in the case now before us. It was followed
in New York by Tillou v. Ins. Co., I Seld. 405, which was
decided on its authority alone without any examination of the
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correctness of the principle asserted in it. The South Caro-
lina case was also decided with the Robert case in view, and
in part rests upon it." The court then proceeds to note that
these cases are exploded by the case of Grosvenor v. Ins. Co.,
17 N. Y. 391, and fully approves the reasoning of the court
in that case. That this doctrine is correct and that the assignee
of the policy succeeds to only the rights which the assignor
might assign, finds support in Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 16 Pet.
405, and Weed v. Ins. Co., ii6 N. Y. 120; 22N. E. 229. In
the latter case the policy was taken out on property, alleged to
belong to the estate of a deceased person, and was made
payable to a mortgagee and creditor of the estate as his interest
might appear. The policy contained a provision that if the
ownership of the assured was other than the sole and uncon-
ditional ownership it should be void. It turned out that the
estate insured did not own the property, and it was held that
the mortgagee acquired no rights by the indorsement.
It is certainly true, ordinarily, that where insurance is
effected and afterward the .assured disposed of the insured
property, assigns the same to his vendee, the vendee taking the
absolute dominion and ownership over the property covered,
and the company consenting to such sale and assignment of
the property and the policy, that thereafter no act of the
originally insured can effect or in any way impair any rights
whatever obtained by the assignee and vendee by reason of
such transfer and assignment of the policy and property
insured. For, in such cases the assured loses all control over
and right to, or title in, the protected property. He becomes
to both the company and the assignee a stranger and a third
party, and could no more destroy or impair the subsequently
vested rights of the assignee by setting fire to the property, or
otherwise violating any of the stipulations or conditions of the
policy than any other stranger in interest under the policy.
After such assignment and sale there is no duty resting on the
originally insured to any one. His rights are gone and in no
event could he recover on the policy in whole or in part. The
.assignee becomes absolutely and for all purposes substituted
-to all the rights of the insured, and the assured will have no
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greater rights in either the policy or property covered than the
assignee had before such sale and assignment. Thereafter, the
assignee and not the assignor, will be held to a compliance
with the terms of the policy. He could not destroy the prop-
erty himself or violate any of its conditions, simply because he
derives his rights through another party on whom was enjoined
the duty of keeping sacred the terms of the contract. Any
other rule would be in defiance of justice and would merit and
receive unqualified condemnation.
On the other hand, the general rule as established by the
great weight of authority and what seems to be much the
better reason, is that where the insurance is taken by the mort-
gagor, and the policy stipurates that the loss, if any, shall be
payable to a third person as his interest may appear, or that
where the policy is assigned or transferred by the mortgagor as
collateral security, any violation of the terms of the policy by
the insured, though without the knowledge or consent of the
mortgagee, will avoid the policy and defeat a recovery by the
latter: Gillet v. Ins. Co., 73 Wis. 203; 41 N. W. 78; Ins.
Co. v. Hulbnan, 92 III. 145 ; Grosvenor v. fins. Co., 17 N. Y.
391 ; Bidwell v. Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. 179; Hale v. Ins. Co.,
6 Gray (Mass.), 169 ; Perry v. Ins. Co., 61 N. Y. 214 ; Weed
v. Ins. Co., 116 N. Y. io6; 22 N. E. 229; Pupke v. Ins. Co.,
17 Wis. 389; State .Ahttal Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 31 Pa. St.
438; .4finock v. Ins. Co., 90 Mich. 236; 51 N. W. 367;
Pcenix Ins. Co. v. IWViis, 70 Tex. 12; 6 S. W. 825; Carberiy
Ins. Co. (Wis.), 56 N. W. 920; Baynton v. Ins. Co.., I6 Barb.
24; Ins. Co. v. Stanton, 57 Ill. 354; Ins. Co. v. Hauslien,
6o Ill. 521 ; Ins. Co. v. Fir; 53 Ill. 151; Ins. Co. v. Daven-
port, 37 Mich. 6o9; Van Buren v. Ins. Co., 28 Mich. 4o4;
Ins. Co. v. Huron Salt & Lumber Co., 31 Mich. 346.
Where the insurance is thus made payable to a third party
it is nevertheless the interest of the insured that is protected.
The contract is with the assured, and the company agrees to
pay him, or any other person designated, to receive the face of
the policy in whole or in part. But if the assured fails or
neglects to furnish proofs of loss, brings or has the action
brought within the time stipulated in the policy; if he increases
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the hazard contrary to the terms of the policy, makes such
false statements in the application or is guilty of any fraud or
bad faith in procuring the insurance; fails to give notice of the
destruction of the property; contracts for additional insurance
when forbidden by the policy to do so, or in any manner fails
to perform and keep inviolate the contract on his part required
by the policy to be kept, he cannot recover; and, as his
assignee succeeds only to such rights as the assured had, his
rights must fall with those originally injured. This is reason-
able. If the assignee could recover regardless of what the
assured might do in violation of the contract, it is clear that
the company would be required in a sense to insure against a
double or at least an increased hazard, whereas by the terms
of the policy the company only undertakes to insure against a
certain defined hazard, and receives pay only for what is thus
expressed. That the companies could not do a profitable busi-
ness if they were subjected to such consequences is clear, and the
natural result would be bankruptcy or insolvency, and their
very existence would soon be a thing of the past unless they
should increase their rate of premiums sufficiently to meet this
extra and unintended risk. Again, how would they increase
their tariff of premium rates? It would be inequitable to make
those patrons who do not mortgage the insured property and
assign the policy as collateral, or have it made payable to a
mortgagee, to pay the same rate of insurance exacted for the
greater hazard. And how are the companies to know when
the policy holder will assign his chose in action? This is
impossible and the underwriter's only safe course would be to
charge every one a rate of premium which would be commen-
surate with the greater hazard. This is clearly wrong. And
to illustrate the force of this contention we will suppose that
A takes out a policy of insurance for $iooo. The property,
perhaps, is not worth more than this sum. He owes B $iooo
and transfers the policy to him as collateral to secure it. He
also owes C $ iooo and executes to C a mortgage on the
insured premises to secure this $Iooo after the transaction
with B. He makes default with C and the latter forecloses
the mortgage and sells the property, completely divests A of
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his title in the insured property, and makes his mortgage debt
by the foreclosure, After the foreclosure and during the life
of the policy, the property is destroyed by fire. B now resorts
-to his policy and compels the insurance company to pay his
$xooo. A has practically sold the property before the fire,
yet he gets the full benefit of the insurance, and the obliging
company is compelled to pay A's. debt to B for him. It
might be answered to this that the company would be sub-
rogated to B's right to collect his $iooo by being compelled
in law to pay the same. But suppose the property insured is
all that A had, or is exempt under the laws of the state in
which he lives? Would this place the company in any better
attitude ? It may be that A destroyed the house himself after
the mortgage foreclosure for the very purpose of requiring the
company to pay his debt to B; and according to that line of
cases which hold that no act of the originally insured can
affect the rights of the assignee, or the party to whom the
policy is made payable for the purpose of securing a debt. It
is patent that a large per centum of such losses as this would
be ruinous to any company. It would be impossible for it to
do business in the face of such odds for any great length of
time, and the eve of prophecy would behold in unerring cer-
tainity its early downfall and ruin. It is clear, therefore that
the better reason as well as natural justice is with that line of
decisions which hold that when a policy is taken out by the
assured, and made payable to a third party, as his interest may
appear, or is by the assured assigned, either absolutely or as
collateral, such third party or mortgagee, assignee, or other
party in interest, can only recover where the assured could
have done so had the policy not been assigned or in any
manner transferred.
It is true that this rule will not obtain, perhaps, where the
mortgagee-who, of course, has an insurable interest in his
mortgagor's property-should for his own protection, procure
a policy of insurance on the mortgaged property. In this case,
of course, the insurance contract is with the mortgagee. The
mortgagor has no interest therein whatever. Neither his
property nor any interest of his is covered by the policy. He
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did not apply for the insurance, did not pay the premium and
no policy was issued or made pajrable to him, and no act of
his-not even the willful destruction of his property by him-
could preclude the right of recovery in the mortgagee. In
cases of this kind there is nothing to revert to the mortgagor.
He may pay his debt, and this will only have the effect of
practically cancelling the insurance, for the mortgagee has an
insurable interest in the property by reason of his debt secured
by his mortgage. When that is satisfied, he has nothing to
insure, and he can suffer no loss by the destruction of the
property. Not so, however, where the policy is issued to the
mortgagor and made payable to the mortgagee as his mort-
gage interest may appear. When this is the case it is plain
that the payment of the secured debt would have the effect of
vesting the full right to all the insurance in the mortgagor, for,
the interest of the mortgagee being extinguished, his right in
the policy ceases as it was only contingent on the existence of
his debt. When that was extinguished the mortgage interest
in the policy and the property covered ipso facto ceased and
became extinguished. The insured thereby becomes entitled
to recover on the policy just as though there had been no
mortgage transaction whatever. In harmony with this rule it
is held by many courts of the highest respectability that the
effect of the clause making the policy payable to a third party
as mortgagee, etc., is but a direction in advance of any loss to
pay the money, when due, to a designated party; which pay-
ment, when so made by the company, discharges its liability
to the extent of the interest of such third person in the .policy,
the assured, of course, being entitled to anything that may
remain: Martin v. Franklin Ins. Co., 9 Vr. 14o; Tirner v.
Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 573 ; Fogg v. Ins. Co., Io Cush. (Mass.)
346; Loring v. Ins. Co., 8 Gray (Mass.) 29; Hale v. Lis. Co.,
6 Gray (Mass.) 169 ; Franklin Savings Institution v. Inzs. Co.,
i 19 Mass. 240.
There has come into use, of late years, however, a mort-
gage clause very different from any that has been considcred.
It seems designed to avoid the consequences of some of the
decisions under the simple mortgage clauses, on the one hand,
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and to the better and more definitely set out the rights and
liabilities of the parties, on the other. It is as follows: "Loss,
if any, payable to A. B., mortgagee or trustee as hereinafter
provided. It being hereby understood and agreed that this
insurance, as to the interest of the mortgagee or trustee only
herein, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the
mortgagor or owner of the property insured, nor by the occu-
pation of the premises for purposes more hazardous than are
permitted by the terms of this policy; provided, that in case
the mortgagor or owner neglects or refuses to pay any
premium due under this policy, then, on demand, the mort-
gagee or trustee shall pay the same ; provided, also, that the
mortgagee or trustee shall notify this company of any change
of ownership or increase of hazard which shall come to his or
their knowledge, and shall have permission for such change of
ownership or increase of hazard duly indorsed on said policy;
and, provided, further, that every increase of hazard not per-
mitted by the policy to the mortgagor shall be paid for by the
mortgagee or trustee on reasonable demand, and after demand
made by this company, upon and refusal by the mortgagor or
owner to pay according to the established schedule of rates.
It is, however, understood that this company reserves the right
to cancel this policy as stipulated in the printed conditions in
said policy; and, also, to cancel this agreement on giving ten
days' notice of their intention to the trustee or mortgagee
named therein, and from and after the expiration of the said
ten days this agreement shall be null and void. It is further
agreed that in case of any other insurance upon the property
hereby insured, then this company shall not be liable under
this policy for a greater portion of any loss sustained than the
sum hereby insured bears to the whole amount of insurance
on said property issued to or held by any party or parties
having an insurable interest therein. It is also agreed that
whenever this company shall pay the mortgage or trustee any
sum for loss under this policy, and shall claim that as to the
mortgagor or owner no liability therefor exists it shall, at once,
and to the extent of such payment, be legally subrogated to
all the rights of the party to whom such payments shall be
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made, under any and all securities held by such party for the
payment of said debt. But such subrogation shall be in
subordination to the claim of said party for the balance of the
debt so secured. Or, said company may, at its option, pay
said mortgagee or trustee the whole debt so secured with all
the interest which may have accrued thereon to the date of
such payment, and shall thereupon receive from the party to
whom such payment shall be made an assignment and transfer
of said debt, with all securities held by such parties for the
payment thereof." The reports do not amount in decisions
and precedents under these comprehensive mortgage clauses,
but the few cases hold, iron-clad as these mortgage clauses
are, that they do not dispense with -the requirements of the
policy except to the extent only that they are ndt required by
the express provisions of the mortgage clause: Hastings v.
Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. i4I; American Building & Loan Association
v. Farmers' Ins. Co., (Wash.) 40 Pac. 125. In the latter case,
the court explaining the effect of such a mortgage clause,
among other things, says : "All the provisions of the policy
continued in force, excepting only such as are inconsistent
with the provisions contained in the clause annexed; but
general provisions of the policy intended for the security and
protection of the company, and which do not relate personally
to the mortgagor, such as the stipulation concerning the time
in which the action shall be brought, are not abrogated or
affected by it. Resort must still be had to the terms of the
policy to ascertain many things which are the very life of the
contract; among others, the amount of insurance, the property
insured, the term of the insurance, and very many matters
concerning which the indorsement itself furnishes absolutely
no information whatever." This is all well said. For,
suppose the term of the policy has lapsed or expired? A
recovery could not be had thereafter on the policy simply,
forsooth, because the mortgage clause had been attached.
Likewise the stipulation that the action on the policy must be
commenced within the period named in the policy notwith-
standing such mortgage clause; American Building & Loan
Assn. v. Farmers' Ins. Co., supra. And where an action is
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brought by the mortgagee on a policy containing such a stipu-
lation, not even the wilful or wanton destruction of the property
by the assured will defeat the right of the mortgagee to the
extent of his mortgage interest, to recover; Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. Williams, 63 Fed. 925. Such an act, it is
true, is a fraud upon the company so far as the assured is con-
cerned, and should he, after such destruction of the property
by himself, pay off and extinguish the mortgage debt, the
-mortgagee's interest in the policy being thereby terminated
and ended, no recovery could be had on the policy at all. All
rights of the assured being defeated by his own act, the policy
becomes absolutely of no force. But if the mortgagee should,
before such payment of the debt to him by the assured, first
collect the amount of his mortgage interest from the insurance
company, the company, upon the payment of the mortgage
debt by the assured to the mortgagee, would doubtless have
its right of action against the mortgagee for such sums as it
may have paid him under the mortgage clause.
While this mortgage clause stipulates that the policy, as to
the interest of the mortgagee " shall not be invalidated by any
act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the property
insured, etc.," this clause must nevertheless yield to another
clause in the policy which provides that the insurer "shall not
be liable under this policy for a greater portion of any loss than
the sum thereby insured bears to the whole amount of insur-
ance on said property, issued to or held by any party or par-
ties having an insurable interest therein." In such case the
mortgagee will be required to prorate the insurance covered,
as it were, by his mortgage clause, with any other insurance
which the mortgagor or any other person having an
insurable interest in the insured property, who may have also
taken out on the same property: Hartford Fi-re Ins. Co. v.
Williams, supra.
Such a mortgage clause has the effect of making a separate
contract of insurance with the mortgagee to the extent of the
mortgage interest: 'Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Coverdale,
48 Kan. 446; 29 Pac. Rep. 682; P/henix Ins. Co. v. Omaha
Land & Trist Co. (Neb.), 6o N. W. 133; City Fie Cent
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Savings Bank v. Ins. Co., 122 Mass. 165; Ins. Co. v. Olcott,
87 Ili. 439. And the clause must be construed with all the
provisions of the policy, and not alone when there is any doubt
as to its effect: Hariford Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, supra ;
Meriden Savings Bank v. Ins. Co., 50 Conn. 396. And the
clause does not partake of the nature of an assignment of the
interest of the insured, in whole or in part, to the mortgagee :
Phenix Ins. Co. v. Omaha Land and Trust Co., supra, and
in this case it is further-held that the failure of the assured to
give written notice of loss under the policy, as provided by its
terms, will not defeat the right of the mortgagee to recover,
and the mortgagee may maintain an action on the policy in
his own name and alone for the amount of his mortgage debt,
especially if no objection is made in the trial court to the want
of proper parties: See also Meriden Savings Bank v. Ins. Co.,
supra. But, on principle, whether it be necessary -for the
insured to give the written notice of loss or not, it would
certainly be well for the mortgagee to do so if in his power.
And the mortgagee should, doubtless, use every effort to have
the assured make the proofs of loss required by the policy,
and, if it is in the power of the mortgagee to fulfil this requir-
inent, he should, out of abundance of caution, if for no other
reason, make the necessary proofs himself, though if it be out
of his power to do so, and the assured refuses, the mort-
gagee could still, no doubt, recover by virtue of the mortgage
clause. But the law certainly enjoins upon him the duty
of exercising at least ordinary diligence and the utmost good
faith.
These comprehensive and binding mortgage clauses seem to
have been necessitated from a demand on the part of mort-
gagees for better security for their debts than the simple and
short clause making the insurance payable to a third as his
interest might appear, or an assignment of the policy as origin-
ally written as collateral security. In all their details they
have not been passed upon by the courts, and it is noticeable
that the decisions afford but little light except as to some
portions of the clause which have received judicial considera-
tion. These lengthy clauses are not all exactly alike, some
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going much more into detail than others. It is apparent,
however, that they all have in view one of the very controlling
ideas that the insured cannot, by any act of his own, defeat a
recovery by the mortgagee to the extent of his mortgage debt.
Certain duties are also devolved upon the mortgagee, such as
giving notice of increased hazard, change of occupation, etc.,
when the same may become known to him, and he is required
to pay the necessary additional premium for any increased
hazard according to the usual tariff of rates for such, and the
company, upon certain notice, for its protection, reserves the
right to cancel the policy even as to the mortgagee. Nor can
the mortgagee recover for his debt simply by declaring on the
policy as it is written with the mortgage clause. It must
affirmatively appear that he has a valid debt secured, that it is
unpaid, and what the amount is. In short, he must show his
interest in the policy, else his complaint will be vulnerable to
demurer: Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Dunbar (Tex. Civ.
App.), 26 S. W. 628.
Out of the somewhat confused and contradictory state of
the decisions, it is fairly safe to lay down the following general
rules as sustained by the better reason and authority :
I. Where the loss is simply made payable to the mortgagee
as his interest may appear, it is but a stipulation for the pay-
ment of the mortgage debt to such third party, and the third
party can recover nothing under the policy where the assured
himself could not do so. The mortgagee can in no event
succeed to a greater or paramount right than that possessed
by him from whom he receives the right to collect for his
mortgage debt, the insurance being taken out on the property,
and at the instance of the assured and paid for by him.
2. Where the insurance is taken out by the mortgagee, for
his own benefit, though the policy is written in the name of
the nominally insured, and made payable to the mort-
gagee as his mortgage interest may appear, the mortgagee
will be entitled to bring the action in his own name to the
extent of his debt so long as any part thereof is in existence,
and the assured can do nothing to defeat the terms and provis-
ions of the policy.
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3. Where the insurance is primarily taken by the assured
and the policy contains the provision making it payable to a
third party as his interest may appear, the action on the policy
must be brought in the name of the insured for the use of the
mortgagee, as a general rule, and if the face of the policy
exceeds the amount of the debt secured, the action cannot be.
maintained by the mortgagee alone, but the assured must be
joined as a party.
4. Where, instead of making the loss payable to the mort-
gagee by the terms of the policy, it is assigned to him as col-
lateral security, the suit at common law must be brought in
the name of the assignor, and the right of the assignee to
recover will depend on the right of the assured to have
recovered if there had been no assignment of the cause of
action.
5. Where the policy contains the iron-clad mortgage clause,
the mortgagee may sue in his own name for that part of the
insurance which secures his mortgage debt, and no more.
6. The mortgagee, before he will be entitled to recover at
all, must show a subsisting debt secured by the policy or the
mortgage clause before he will be permitted to recover anything
in any event. And he must do and perform in good faith all
things on his part to be performed under the policy and the
mortgage clause, which should be construed together, and he is
bound by all the terms and conditions of the policy not in
irreconcilable conflict-with the mortgage clause.
7. No act of the assured, such as the wilful destruction of
the insured property, or failure to comply with any of-the con-
dititions of the policy required to be performed by the insured,
will defeat an action by the mortgagee on a policy containing
the iron-clad clause. W. C. RODGERS.
Nashville, Ark., July, 1895.
